Delhi high court upholds section 9 interim protection restraining creation Of third party rights in 50% saleable area of commercial mall project

Case Title: Bhupesh Kumar Dhingra and Ors. v. Rajeev Behl
Case No.: FAO(OS) (Comm) 216/2026
Coram: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Bharat Parashar
Citation: (2026) ibclaw.in 6649 HC
Date of Decision: 05.11.2026
The Delhi High Court has dismissed an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, against an order of the Single Judge granting interim protection under Section 9. The Division Bench of Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Bharat Parashar found no perversity or misapplication of settled principles in the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge.
The Respondent, Rajeev Behl, was one of the three original promoters of the Realtech Group. A commercial mall project was being developed by S.S. Con-Build Pvt. Ltd. (SSCBPL), which was jointly owned by the Dhingra Group and the Realtech Group, each holding 50%. After disputes among the promoters, an MOU-I dated 02.06.2011 divided the businesses of the group, and the Project allegedly fell to the Respondent. On 20.09.2011, an MOU-II was executed between the Respondent and Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, recognising him as the person entitled to represent the interest of Realtech Infrastructure Limited (RIL) in the Project. RIL was not a party to it.
Arbitration over MOU-I resulted in an award dated 28.01.2018 declaring MOU-I valid and binding. The Appellants contended that the award did not declare the Respondent to be the successor-in-interest of RIL. A Divestment Agreement dated 18.01.2018 transferred the stake of RIL in the Project to Suridhi Commercial Infra Pvt. Ltd., Appellant No. 3. The Respondent alleged it to be a sham transaction and claimed to have learnt of it on 16.07.2019.
The Respondent invoked arbitration by notice dated 18.02.2026 under Clause 9 of MOU-II and filed a Section 9 petition seeking to restrain the Appellants from creating third party rights in, or dealing with, 50% of the saleable area of the Project. By order dated 03.07.2026, the Single Judge allowed the petition, holding that the documents disclosed a bona fide and arguable claim, that the balance of convenience favoured the Respondent, and that further third party rights would complicate enforcement of any eventual award. The question whether Appellant No. 3 is bound by the arbitration agreement was left to the Arbitral Tribunal.
Before the Division Bench, the Appellants argued that the Respondent made no independent investment, that the MOU-I award did not declare him successor-in-interest of RIL, that his conduct and delay in enforcement were ignored, that any cause of action lay against RIL, that the claims were barred by limitation, and that substantial portions of the Project had already been sold to third parties who were not impleaded.
The Court noted that the Single Judge had dealt with the three essential ingredients, namely prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Citing Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., it stated that an appellate court does not interfere merely because another view is possible, and interferes only where discretion is exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or contrary to settled principles.
On the contention that the Respondent never acquired the interest of RIL, the Court observed that it raised a serious dispute for adjudication in arbitration, and that a petition under Section 11 had been filed as ARB.P. 919/2026. It was undisputed that the Respondent was initially inducted into SSCBPL as a representative of RIL. The existence of the arbitration agreement under MOU-II between the Respondent and Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 was not in dispute. The Court held that his claim could not be held ex facie untenable at the Section 9 stage, and that the argument that the cause of action lay only against RIL could not be accepted at this stage.
On limitation, the Court noted that the Single Judge had treated it as a mixed question of law and fact to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal after evidence. On duration, the Court observed that the interim protection, originally operative till constitution of the Tribunal, was extended by order dated 18.08.2026 till disposal of the Section 17 application, and that this order was not challenged in the appeal.
On the plea regarding third parties, the Court held that the protection operates against the Appellants and restrains creation of further third party rights. It clarified that the order cannot be understood as adjudicating or prejudicing independent rights already acquired by third parties who were not before the Single Judge, and any such transferee may assert its rights in accordance with law. The Court did not examine further the Single Judge's observation on the scope of Section 9 jurisdiction in relation to non-signatories, since the restraint is directed against the Appellants and persons claiming through or under them.
The Court also held that the earlier proceedings relied on by the Appellants did not advance their case, noting that interim protection had in fact been granted in O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 259/2023 and continued till disposal of the enforcement petition, and that the order in the enforcement petition only issued notice. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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