top of page

Calcutta high court sets aside arbitral award granting loss of profit without evidence, holds award silent on terms of the MOU

Nov 13
4 min read
Calcutta High Court Overturns Arbitral Award for Loss of Profit Due to Lack of Evidence, Citing MOU Ambiguities.
Calcutta High Court Overturns Arbitral Award for Loss of Profit Due to Lack of Evidence, Citing MOU Ambiguities.

Case Title: Friends Engineering Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Digha Shankarpur Development Authority

Case No.: AO-COM No. 40 of 2026

Citation: (2026) ibclaw.in 6052 HC

Coram: Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Aryak Dutt

Decided on: 6 October 2026

 

A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has set aside an arbitral award dated 14 February 2014 arising from a Memorandum of Understanding for construction of a market complex. The Bench held that the District Judge's judgment setting aside the award under Section 34 could not be sustained, but upon examining the grounds on the arbitral record, found the award itself to be patently illegal and perverse.

Digha Shankarpur Development Authority (DSDA) proposed a two-storied market complex of about 690 stalls at New Digha. Under the MOU dated 25 November 2004, the appellant, as Builder, was to construct the complex at its own cost, at an estimated cost of Rs. 5,26,90,708, within 24 months. Clause 6 entitled the Builder to levy the construction expenditure for each stall from prospective lessees or buyers, but the per-stall rates were left blank. DSDA suspended the work in March 2005 and cancelled the MOU by letter dated 2 May 2005. The Sole Arbitrator, Justice Samaresh Banerjea (Retd.), held the termination illegal and arbitrary and made an award in favour of the appellant. The largest component was Rs. 51,85,243 towards loss of expected profit, computed at 15 percent of the unexecuted value of the work.

The District Judge allowed DSDA's application under Section 34 on two grounds: that the expert's report did not reflect the actual state of affairs, and that the Arbitrator failed to appreciate certain Urban Development Department memos, a Ministry letter and a CRZ map. The award was held to be “contrary to the law and justice” and in conflict with public policy. The appellant challenged this under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act read with Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The appeal was transferred to the Commercial Appellate Division under Section 15 of the 2015 Act, and the Bench noted that this did not enlarge the scope of the appeal.

The Bench held that the weight to be attached to the expert's report was a matter for the Tribunal. The expert had been appointed under Section 26 on the joint prayer of the parties and at DSDA's own suggestion, and DSDA's objection was tested through the examination of its witness. The Tribunal's view was a possible one, and the Court below had substituted its own assessment, which amounted to re-appreciation of evidence. As to the documents, the Bench noted the appellant's unrebutted submission that they were never part of the arbitral record and were not pleaded in the Section 34 application. The Bench also held that “contrary to law and justice” is not a ground under Section 34, and that the judgment did not identify which head of public policy was offended.

Since the Section 34 application was filed in 2014, before 23 October 2015, the challenge was tested under Section 34 as it then stood, read with ONGC v. Saw Pipes, ONGC v. Western Geco and Associate Builders v. DDA. The Bench held that an Appeal Court under Section 37 can examine grounds urged below on the arbitral record, and confined its examination to the legal basis of liability and the quantification of claims, without disturbing findings of fact.

On liability, the Bench noted that DSDA's defence was that the MOU was incomplete and at best a quasi-contract. The MOU required the Builder to build at its own cost and recover the expenditure from prospective lessees at rates that were left blank. The award did not examine this and treated the MOU as a conventional works contract with a price payable by DSDA. Such an award was held not to be reasoned within the meaning of Dyna Technologies v. Crompton Greaves, and patently illegal for disregarding Section 28(3) as it then stood.

On loss of profit, the Bench held that A.T. Brij Paul Singh v. State of Gujarat does not lay down an inflexible rule that 15 percent of the unexecuted value is payable whenever a works contract is terminated. Damages under Section 73 of the Contract Act compensate loss that naturally arises from breach, and a claim for loss of profit must rest on material showing that profit would in fact have been earned. The Bench found no evidence of the rates, the demand for the stalls or the margin the appellant would have earned, and no finding that the unexecuted work could lawfully have been carried out. It also observed that Brij Paul Singh and B.B.M. Enterprise concerned works contracts in which the employer paid the contract price.

The Bench found further defects in quantification. The body of the award arrived at Rs. 51,85,243 while the operative part awarded Rs. 51,08,000. Under Claims 8 and 9, sums were allowed on presumption without proof. On establishment expenses, the Tribunal held that DSDA's share of the delay was two months out of eight, yet awarded Rs. 4,00,000 of the Rs. 5,28,000 claimed, when two months of eight would yield Rs. 1,32,000. An off-site sum of Rs. 1,00,000 held payable in the body of the award was omitted from the operative part. The awards of interest and costs were held to be consequential.

Holding the award not separable, as excising any part would require recomputing the others, the Bench set aside the award in its entirety, along with the District Judge's judgment. The interim award of Rs. 15,00,000, made on consent and already paid, was not the subject of the Section 34 challenge and remains unaffected. There was no order as

Comments


bottom of page