Bombay high court refers to larger bench whether promoter-allottee disputes under RERA are non-arbitrable as a class

Case Name: Rensar Infra Pvt. Ltd. v. Rais Kasam Shaikh and Ors.
Case No.: Arbitration Application No. 205 of 2026
Coram: Justice Amit Borkar
Citation: (2026) ibclaw.in 6036 HC
Decided on: 7 October 2026
The Bombay High Court has referred to a larger Bench the question whether a dispute between a promoter and an individual allottee under an Agreement for Sale containing an arbitration clause is non-arbitrable as a class merely because the transaction is governed by the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), or whether arbitrability must be examined by reference to the subject matter and nature of relief. Justice Amit Borkar deferred the Section 11 proceedings until the larger Bench decides the issue.
The Applicant, Rensar Infra Pvt. Ltd., sought appointment of a Sole Arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for disputes with Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 arising from an Agreement for Sale dated 31 December 2020 in respect of Flat No. 1901. Respondent No. 3 was also a party to the Agreement. The Applicant invoked the arbitration clause by a notice under Section 21 dated 25 July 2025. Before that, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had filed a complaint before MahaRERA under Section 18 of RERA, which was allowed on 14 August 2024. The Applicant's review was rejected and its appeal was pending before the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal.
The claims sought to be referred were Rs.92,45,590/- towards additional area, Rs.41,59,726/- towards balance consideration, and compensation said to arise from complaints made to the MCGM.
The Applicant argued that the Court's enquiry under Section 11 is limited, relying on SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning. It sought to distinguish Rashmi Realty Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Rahul Pagariya, relying on Abhay Kanhere v. Morya Infraconstruct and the principle that a judgment is a precedent only for the issue decided. It also submitted that Section 8 does not bar an independent claim and that its claims were different from the Section 18 complaint.
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 relied on paragraph 63(i) of Rashmi Realty and on Laxman Mura Vaid v. Shree Siddhivinayak Infrastructure and Realty to submit that such disputes are non-arbitrable. They also argued that the claims fall within Sections 19(6) and 19(7) of RERA, that the Applicant had not invoked Section 8 before MahaRERA, that the claims were raised in prayers (e) and (f) of its appeal, and that arbitration would amount to splitting the cause of action, relying on Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya and Anil v. Rajendra.
The Court found that a valid arbitration agreement exists. Referring to Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd., Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation and NTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd., it observed that non-arbitrability can be examined at the referral stage, but only in a limited and prima facie manner. It held that the objection could not be rejected merely by pointing to Section 16.
On the claims, the Court noted that the balance consideration and additional area arose from the same real estate transaction, with the promoter claiming against allottees, and that the dispute therefore had a clear connection with the promoter-allottee relationship. It did not accept that the compensation claim was a mere afterthought, leaving proof, loss and recoverability open.
On Section 8, the Court held that it cannot operate as a permanent bar against every independent claim. Anil was distinguished because there was no earlier final decision on a Section 8 application, and the original MahaRERA order was stated to be ex parte. The Court also referred to Neo Developers Private Limited v. Rahul Bhargava and Ors., 2026 INSC 875, in which parallel proceedings were not permitted where the prayers before both authorities were substantially the same. It held that this decision did not settle the present controversy. At the same time, the Court clarified that if any particular prayer is substantially the same as one placed before the RERA forum and pursued before the Appellate Tribunal, arbitration cannot be used as another parallel route.
On limitation, the Court relied on paragraph 133 of Krish Spinning and held that the Section 11 application was not shown to be time-barred. Whether each claim is within limitation, including the effect of part-payments made on 9 August 2023 and 10 August 2023 under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, was kept open.
The Court then noted the conflict of views. Rashmi Realty records at paragraph 63(i) that disputes between an individual allottee and a promoter covered by RERA are non-arbitral. Abhay Kanhere observed that the question before it was whether an arbitration clause ousts RERA jurisdiction and that the converse question was not decided. The Delhi High Court in Priyanka Tak Sood had treated RERA and arbitration as concurrent remedies, while Laxman Mura Vaid followed Rashmi Realty.
Citing the Constitution Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, the Court observed that when a coordinate Bench cannot be reconciled with an earlier view, the proper course is to place the matter before a larger Bench. It stated that it did not hold every promoter and individual allottee dispute under a RERA governed Agreement for Sale to be non-arbitrable, nor did it hold every such dispute arbitrable only because the Agreement contains an arbitration clause.
The question referred asks whether, having regard to Sections 79, 88 and 89 and other provisions of RERA, such a dispute is non-arbitrable as a class, or whether arbitrability must be examined by reference to the subject matter, nature of relief and matters the RERA authorities are empowered to determine, and consequently whether paragraph 63(i) of Rashmi Realty is a general rule of non-arbitrability. The papers have been placed before the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench.
_edited.png)



Comments