Seat of arbitration Prevails over venue of hearings: Allahabad high court reaffirms jurisdictional certainty in Bb coach tech India pvt. ltd. v. presiding officer, commercial court
- Jul 3
- 5 min read

Bb Coachtech India Private Limited v. The Presiding Officer, Commercial Court and Another
Matters Under Article 227 No. 6463 of 2026
Decided on 27 May 2026
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Before Justice Piyush Agrawal
The Allahabad High Court, in its decision dated 27 May 2026 in Bb Coachtech India Private Limited v. The Presiding Officer, Commercial Court and Another, revisited the distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration and reaffirmed the settled principle that the seat of arbitration alone determines the court having supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings. The judgment is significant because it addresses the recurring confusion between the place where arbitration hearings are conducted and the juridical seat chosen by the parties in their agreement.
The dispute arose from arbitration proceedings initiated pursuant to a purchase order executed between the parties. Earlier, the petitioner had approached the Allahabad High Court through Arbitration and Conciliation Application No. 7 of 2022. By an order dated 28 February 2023, the High Court appointed Justice Shashi Kant Gupta, a former Judge of the Allahabad High Court, as the sole arbitrator with the consent of both parties. Following his appointment, arbitration proceedings commenced and the parties filed their respective claims and defences. Issues were framed by the arbitral tribunal on 30 April 2024 and the proceedings progressed in the ordinary course.
Under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an arbitral award is required to be delivered within the prescribed statutory period. The original period of twelve months expired during the pendency of the proceedings. Consequently, the mandate of the arbitrator was extended by six months. Thereafter, with the consent of both parties, a further extension was granted up to 7 September 2025. Before the expiry of this extended period, the petitioner filed an application under Section 29A(4) before the Commercial Court at Kanpur Nagar seeking further extension of the arbitrator's mandate.
The petitioner maintained that Kanpur Nagar was the proper forum because the arbitration agreement expressly conferred jurisdiction upon the courts at Kanpur. However, despite the application having been filed before the expiry of the mandate, no decision was taken for several months. The petitioner therefore filed another application on 3 February 2026 requesting extension of time. By an order dated 17 February 2026, the Commercial Court rejected the application. The Commercial Court reasoned that since the arbitration proceedings were being conducted at Prayagraj, exclusive jurisdiction would lie with the Commercial Court at Prayagraj and not with the Commercial Court at Kanpur Nagar.
Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was argued that Clauses 17.1 and 17.2 of the purchase order clearly stipulated that arbitration would take place at Kanpur Nagar and that the courts at Kanpur would enjoy exclusive jurisdiction in relation to disputes arising from the contract. According to the petitioner, the mere fact that hearings were held at Prayagraj for convenience could not alter the contractual designation of Kanpur as the seat of arbitration. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's decision in BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2022 SC 2673. Significantly, the respondents did not dispute either the factual position or the legal principles relied upon by the petitioner.
After examining the record, the High Court found that the contractual clauses unmistakably indicated Kanpur Nagar as the designated place of arbitration and conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the courts situated there. The Court noted that although the arbitral proceedings had been conducted at Prayagraj with the consent of the parties, such conduct was merely a matter of convenience and did not alter the juridical seat of arbitration agreed upon in the contract.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied extensively upon the Supreme Court's judgment in BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions Pvt. Ltd. The Supreme Court had clarified that Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act preserves party autonomy by allowing parties to freely choose the seat of arbitration. Once chosen, the seat determines the court that exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral process. The Supreme Court further observed that hearings may be conducted at a different location under Section 20(3) for practical reasons such as convenience, recording evidence, consulting experts, or inspecting documents and property. Such a venue does not become the juridical seat merely because proceedings are conducted there.
The Allahabad High Court also referred to the recent Supreme Court judgment in J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders India Private Limited, 2026 INSC 368. In that decision, the Supreme Court once again emphasised the distinction between seat and venue and held that the designation of a seat operates in the same manner as an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The Court explained that once a seat is designated, it becomes the centre of gravity of the arbitration and courts at that place alone possess supervisory authority over arbitral proceedings and challenges arising from them. The place where hearings occur or where the award is signed cannot alter the seat unless there is an express agreement between the parties.
The High Court further relied upon its own recent decision in M/s HSL Software Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Auspicious Shelters Pvt. Ltd., where similar principles had been applied. In that case also, the Court had held that an exclusive jurisdiction clause identifying a particular place as the seat of arbitration would prevail over the location where hearings were actually conducted.
Applying these settled principles, Justice Piyush Agrawal held that Kanpur Nagar had consciously been designated as the seat of arbitration by the parties. Consequently, the Commercial Court at Kanpur alone possessed jurisdiction to entertain proceedings relating to the arbitration, including applications under Section 29A(4) seeking extension of the arbitrator's mandate. The Court observed that the conduct of hearings at Prayagraj was merely an arrangement made for the convenience of the parties and could not displace the contractual seat or confer jurisdiction upon courts at Prayagraj.
The High Court concluded that the order of the Commercial Court returning the petitioner's application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction could not be sustained in the eyes of law, and the same was hereby quashed. The matter was remanded to the Commercial Court at Kanpur Nagar for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Commercial Court was directed to decide the matter expeditiously and within two months from the date on which a certified copy of the High Court's judgment was produced before it.
The decision reinforces one of the most important principles of modern arbitration law: the distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration must be preserved to ensure certainty, predictability, and respect for party autonomy. By reiterating that the seat of arbitration determines supervisory jurisdiction regardless of where hearings are physically conducted, the Allahabad High Court has aligned itself with the consistent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and further strengthened the legal framework governing arbitration in India. The judgment serves as a reminder that convenience of hearings cannot override the parties' contractual choice of seat and that jurisdictional questions in arbitration must be resolved with reference to the agreed juridical seat rather than the location where proceedings happen to take place.
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