Rajasthan high court holds order VII rule 11 CPC cannot be invoked to seek rejection of a section 9 application

Rajasthan High Court Decision: Order VII Rule 11 CPC Not Applicable for Section 9 Application Rejection

Case Name: Marudhara Primeinfra Pvt. Ltd. v. Lahoty Buildcon Ltd. and Ors.

Case No.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19263/2026 with S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18418/2026

Coram: Justice Anand Sharma

Citation: (2026) ibclaw.in 5783 HC

Decided on: 29 September 2026

The Rajasthan High Court has held that Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 cannot be invoked to seek rejection of an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 at the threshold. Justice Anand Sharma observed that a Section 9 application cannot be equated with a plaint or a suit.

The writ petition under Article 227 was filed by Marudhara Primeinfra Pvt. Ltd. against an order dated 8 September 2026 of the Commercial Court No. 3, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, which dismissed its application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC as not maintainable. Lahoty Buildcon Ltd. had filed one composite Section 9 application on the basis of two agreements dated 9 November 2024 and 20 June 2025, both containing arbitration clauses. An application under Section 11 for appointment of an arbitrator was pending before the High Court.

The petitioner objected that one composite application could not be filed on two separate and independent agreements relating to different projects, subject matters and obligations. It raised the objection in its reply dated 16 February 2026 and then in an application dated 19 August 2026 under Order VII Rule 11(d), contending that the application was barred by law. The Commercial Court dismissed the application but left the objection open for decision at the final adjudication of the Section 9 application.

The petitioner relied on Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Limited and on decisions of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts following it. It cited Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy for the width of the expression "barred by law" and Amrit Lal Madan v. K.D. Ahuja, and argued that Section 9(1) makes the procedural provisions of the CPC applicable. The respondent relied on Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja, Janset Labs Pvt. Ltd. v. Sudha Analyticals, Uma Shankar Stake Rice Industry v. G. Ramesh and Plaza Garments v. Textile Apparels, and contended that a Section 9 application is neither a plaint nor a suit.

The Court noted that Section 9 enables a party to approach the Court for interim measures of protection before, during or after arbitral proceedings but before enforcement of the award. Referring to Firm Ashok Traders, it recorded that such an application is not a suit. Referring to Essar House Private Limited v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited, it noted that the technicalities of the CPC should not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 for securing the ends of justice.

The Court observed that Order VII Rule 11 deals with rejection of a plaint and the termination of a suit at the threshold. Proceedings under Section 9 are not instituted by presentation of a plaint and do not involve adjudication of substantive rights after framing of issues and recording of evidence. It expressed complete agreement with the Telangana and Delhi High Court decisions cited by the respondent and held that, in the absence of any statutory provision making Order VII Rule 11 applicable to Section 9 proceedings, it cannot be invoked to seek rejection of such an application at the preliminary stage.

Amrit Lal Madan was distinguished as it concerned territorial jurisdiction in view of the seat of arbitration. As to Duro Felguera, the Court stated that there was no quarrel with the general proposition, but whether it applies depends on whether the agreements are sufficiently interlinked. That in turn depends on the terms of the agreements, the intention of the parties and the nature of their contractual and transactional relationship, which the Court held to be beyond the scope of scrutiny at the preliminary stage. The Court added that the question could not be decided merely from the titles of the agreements or the presence of separate arbitration clauses.

On the scope of Article 227, the Court observed that supervisory jurisdiction is meant to keep subordinate courts within their jurisdiction and does not call for interference unless there is patent lack of jurisdiction, manifest perversity, failure to exercise jurisdiction or an error resulting in grave injustice. It found that the petitioner had not established any such ground, particularly because the Commercial Court had expressly preserved the objection for consideration while deciding the Section 9 application.

The Court clarified that its observations are confined to whether the Commercial Court was justified in declining to reject the Section 9 application under Order VII Rule 11 at that stage, and that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the objection that the two agreements are independent.

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19263/2026 was dismissed with these observations. In the connected S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18418/2026, filed by Lahoty Buildcon Ltd., the Court directed the Commercial Court to decide Arbitration Application No. 58/2026 expeditiously, preferably within four months from receipt of a copy of the judgment, without being influenced by any observation on the merits of the underlying dispute.