Only the Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction Can Extend the Mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29A: Supreme Court Settles the Law

Supreme Court Clarifies: Only Civil Courts Can Extend Arbitral Tribunal Mandates Under Section 29A.

Only the Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction Can Extend the Mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29A: Supreme Court Settles the Law

Questions of Law Referred to the Division Bench

The Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. (2026 INSC 92) was called upon to resolve a significant jurisdictional controversy that had resulted in inconsistent approaches across High Courts in India. The controversy arose from two questions referred by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court at Goa to a Division Bench. These questions essentially concerned the proper forum for filing an application under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when an arbitral tribunal fails to render an award within the statutory or extended timelines. The questions attempted to differentiate between situations where the arbitral tribunal was constituted by the High Court under Section 11(6) and where it was constituted by the parties by mutual consent under Section 11(2).

The Division Bench answered these questions by holding that where the High Court appoints the arbitral tribunal, the High Court alone would have jurisdiction under Section 29A, whereas in cases of party-appointed tribunals, the jurisdiction would lie with the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. This reasoning subsequently formed the basis for setting aside an order of the Commercial Court that had extended the arbitral mandate. The correctness of this approach was placed before the Supreme Court.

The Simple Question for Consideration

At the outset, the Supreme Court reframed the controversy by stripping it of unnecessary complexity. The Court observed that the issue did not warrant bifurcation based on the mode of appointment of the arbitrator. Instead, the real and singular question was whether, upon failure of an arbitral tribunal to conclude proceedings within the prescribed or extended period, an application under Section 29A for extension of time lies before the High Court or before the Civil Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.

The Court held that the very act of splitting the issue into two distinct scenarios had contributed to the erroneous reasoning adopted by several High Courts and had resulted in avoidable doctrinal confusion.

Facts of the Case

The dispute emanated from a Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 11 January 2021 entered into by members of the Chowgule family. An arbitration clause embedded in the settlement agreement was invoked on 18 May 2021 due to subsequent disagreements. During the arbitral proceedings, the presiding arbitrator resigned, compelling one of the parties to approach the High Court under Section 11 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator. The High Court allowed the application and appointed an arbitrator on 31 October 2023.

Parallelly, as the arbitral proceedings could not be concluded within the statutorily mandated period, an application under Section 29A seeking extension of time was filed before the Commercial Court. The Commercial Court allowed the extension on 2 January 2024. This order was challenged on the ground that the Commercial Court lacked jurisdiction, as the arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court. The Single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench, which ruled against the Commercial Court’s jurisdiction. The Single Judge thereafter set aside the Commercial Court’s order, prompting the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Divergence in the Opinion of the High Courts on Interpretation of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e)

The Supreme Court undertook an extensive survey of High Court jurisprudence and noted the existence of two distinct interpretative streams. One line of authority held that the term “Court” in Section 29A must necessarily take its meaning from Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, irrespective of whether the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court or by the parties. According to this view, once an arbitrator is appointed under Section 11, the appointing court becomes functus officio, and any further judicial intervention under Part I of the Act must be exercised by the court defined under Section 2(1)(e).

The opposing line of authority adopted a contextual interpretation, holding that allowing a Civil Court to extend or terminate the mandate of an arbitrator appointed by the High Court would result in a jurisdictional anomaly and conflict of authority. To avoid such a perceived conflict, these judgments held that the High Court must retain jurisdiction under Section 29A where it had appointed the arbitrator.

Scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The Supreme Court emphasised that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained and comprehensive code. Chapter III deals with the appointment and composition of arbitral tribunals, while Chapters V and VI govern the conduct of arbitral proceedings, making of the award, and termination of proceedings. Section 29A, which prescribes time limits and empowers courts to extend or terminate the arbitral mandate, falls squarely within Chapters V and VI.

The Court underscored that the legislative design consciously separates the appointment function under Section 11 from supervisory and curial functions such as those under Section 29A. Any interpretation that conflates these two distinct stages would be inconsistent with the statutory architecture.

Scope of the Referral Court’s Jurisdiction under Section 11

Relying on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and subsequent authoritative pronouncements such as Duro Felguera SA v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. and SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning Mills Pvt. Ltd., the Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction exercised under Section 11 is special, limited, and exhausted upon appointment of the arbitral tribunal. The referral court does not retain supervisory control over the arbitral proceedings once the tribunal is constituted.

The Court categorically rejected the notion that a High Court or the Supreme Court continues to oversee arbitral proceedings merely because it appointed the arbitrator. Such an assumption, the Court held, is alien to the scheme of the Act and contrary to settled precedent.

True Text and Context of Section 29A

The Supreme Court analysed Section 29A in depth and reiterated that it was introduced to instil efficiency, discipline, and timeliness in arbitration proceedings. The provision mandates termination of the arbitral mandate upon expiry of the stipulated period, subject to extension by the court. It also empowers the court to reduce arbitrators’ fees, impose costs, and substitute arbitrators where delay is attributable to the tribunal.

The Court held that all these powers are curial in nature and must be exercised by the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e). There is no textual or contextual basis to infer that Parliament intended a different forum merely because the arbitrator was appointed by a constitutional court under Section 11.

Interpretation of the Expression “Court” under Section 2(1)(e)

Applying settled principles of statutory interpretation, the Court held that a defined term must ordinarily bear the meaning assigned to it unless the context clearly demands otherwise. Relying on State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors and Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels Ltd., the Court reaffirmed that Section 2(1)(e) provides an exhaustive definition of “Court” for the purposes of Part I of the Act.

The Court found no contextual compulsion in Section 29A to depart from this definition. The fear of a “hierarchical anomaly” was held to be legally irrelevant, as jurisdiction flows solely from statute and not from perceived judicial status.

Applicability of Section 42

The Supreme Court also clarified that Section 42 of the Act, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court where the first application is made, does not apply to applications under Section 11. Since a Section 11 application is not made before a “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e), it does not anchor jurisdiction for subsequent applications under Part I, including Section 29A.

Conclusion and Author’s Opinion

The Supreme Court ultimately held that only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, or the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction where applicable, has the authority to extend the mandate of an arbitral tribunal under Section 29A, regardless of whether the tribunal was appointed by the High Court or by the parties. The High Court exercising powers under Section 11 does not retain jurisdiction for the purposes of Section 29A. Consequently, the Court set aside the decisions of the Division Bench and the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court at Goa and restored the Commercial Court’s order extending the arbitral mandate.

Author’s Opinion:This judgment is a decisive and much-needed clarification that restores doctrinal coherence to Indian arbitration law. By firmly separating the appointment function under Section 11 from curial supervision under Section 29A, the Supreme Court has reinforced the principle that jurisdiction must flow strictly from statutory mandate rather than judicial hierarchy. The ruling prevents unnecessary centralisation of arbitral supervision in constitutional courts, strengthens the role of Commercial and Civil Courts, and promotes efficiency and certainty in arbitral proceedings. Importantly, it realigns Section 29A with its legislative purpose of expeditious dispute resolution and ensures uniform application across jurisdictions, thereby enhancing India’s arbitration-friendly framework.

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